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UKIP's Performance in the 2015
General Election: A Series of
Unfulfilled Expectations
Les élections législatives de 2015 au Royaume-Uni : Quel bilan pour le UKIP ?
Karine Tournier-Sol
2014 was undoubtedly the best year in UKIP's history. The party's continuous rise since
2012 culminated in its historic victory at the European elections in May 2014. Following
this  political  earthquake,  the  positive  dynamic  enjoyed  by  UKIP  showed  no  sign  of
slowing down and translated into the (no less historic) election of the first two UKIP MPs
in by-elections triggered by the defections of two Conservative MPs, Douglas Carswell and
Mark Reckless. As 2014 drew to an end, the party's electoral prospects for the upcoming
general election therefore looked unexpectedly good, with opinion polls predicting that
UKIP was on its way towards winning up to a dozen seats. Expectations were thus high
among the Ukippers in the run-up to the election campaign, all the more so since another
hung parliament seemed very likely, possibly giving UKIP a role to play in determining
the balance of power.
However, despite these encouraging signs, there were still major obstacles for UKIP to
overcome in the forthcoming general election. Until then, the party's electoral success
had been limited to second-order elections,  which are traditionally used by voters to
express their dissatisfaction with the party in government. The question was therefore
whether the populist party was only a recipient of the protest vote or whether it could
turn its growing support into positive endorsement in a general election – a first-order
election in which the first-past-the-post system acts as a barrier to the representation of
small parties. The 2015 general election therefore represented UKIP's biggest challenge so
far. It would also put to the test the process of professionalisation the party had recently
entered with the aim of achieving a new dimension in British politics. The stakes were
thus high, especially for its leader, Nigel Farage, who stood for the constituency of South
Thanet and had announced that he would resign if he did not win the seat, considering
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that he would not be a credible leader anymore. UKIP therefore seemed to be at a critical
moment of its history.
As it turned out, the results fell short of the party's expectations as UKIP only returned
one MP to Westminster. This paper aims at examining UKIP's performance in the 2015
general election by first focusing on the campaign, in which the party found it hard to
exist and capture attention, despite Nigel Farage's confrontational tactics. The election
was also marked by the party's efforts to demonstrate that it had reached a new stage in
its evolution and had gained credibility, notably through a wide-ranging and fully-costed
manifesto, which we shall turn to in a second part. Finally, although the "UKIP effect" was
not as significant as expected, the results of the election will be analysed and put into
perspective in the third part, which will also reflect on the brief civil war which erupted
in the party ranks in the aftermath of the election. This will lead us to conclude on the
party's prospects in the perspective of the EU referendum which David Cameron's victory
has now firmly put on the political agenda.
 
A disappointing campaign
In the early months of 2015 – referred to as "the pre-campaign" – UKIP kept a relatively
low  profile.  Its  charismatic  leader,  usually  keen  to  capture  media  attention,  was
surprisingly absent from the headlines – so much so that rumours of ill-health started to
circulate, prompting Nigel Farage to respond publicly at the party spring conference by
insisting that he was as "fit as a flea".1 He later explained that this unusual reserve had
been part  of  a  deliberate  political  strategy  to  save  his  energy  and "best  lines  for  the
campaign proper".2 In the final weeks of the campaign, he finally admitted suffering from
back pain and receiving treatment. 
Unfortunately for UKIP, its supposedly low-key strategy during the pre-campaign was not
emulated by all its official representatives, and as often in the party's history, a series of
scandals erupted, causing embarrassment in the run-up to the general election. In March,
UKIP MEP and parliamentary candidate Janice Atkinson was expelled from the party over
an expenses scandal. Shortly afterwards, David Coburn, the only Scottish UKIP MEP, also
made the headlines for comparing Scottish minister Humza Yousaf to Islamist terrorist
Abu  Hamza.  In  the  weeks  up  to  the  election,  gaffes  and  controversial  comments
multiplied, leading several parliamentary candidates to stand down. This was actually
nothing new or exceptional, and while Nigel Farage complained of media bias, the fact is
that  this  gaffe-prone aspect  of  UKIP is  very much linked to its  nature as  a  party of
amateurs, in contrast with the professional politicians that it castigates in its political
discourse.  Although opinion polls  have repeatedly  shown that  those scandals  do not
affect UKIP support, at the time they distracted attention from the party's message and
reinforced the impression that the UKIP campaign was having trouble taking off. 
Certainly more harmful for the party was the manifest confusion over its immigration
policy, which is now the central focus of the party and also the main driver of UKIP
support. In the space of a few days, its immigration targets changed from 50,000 to 30,000
before being dropped altogether, thereby blurring the party's message on its core policy
and undermining its credibility. Such ambiguity is particularly detrimental for populist
parties like UKIP whose success is built on a clear, simple and straightforward discourse.
When the official campaign started on 30 March, UKIP had lost ground, as reflected in the
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opinion polls which showed that, on average, support for UKIP had slipped from 19% in
the autumn to 14% in the first months of 2015.
Unsurprisingly, UKIP chose to focus its campaign on immigration, which was the "biggest
election issue of all" as Nigel Farage wrote in the Daily Express.3 Symbolically, the UKIP
leader launched his party's campaign in St Margaret's Bay, near Dover, where he unveiled
UKIP's first election poster, featuring three escalators leading up to the top of the White
Cliffs in Dover and saying: "Immigration is three times higher than the Tories promised"
– the poster itself being a modification of one which had been used for the European
elections a year earlier. Nigel Farage argued that not only does immigration put pressure
on wages and public services, but it also has a cultural impact on communities and "has
left Britain almost unrecognizable"4 from what it was 10 to 15 years ago. Those arguments
had already been aired during the pre-campaign and were to be developed further. In
particular, UKIP wanted new immigrants to pay for private health insurance for 5 years
before benefiting from the NHS – the same system had been suggested for schooling,
sparking controversy, and it was eventually dropped. But the most contentious idea put
forward by  the  UKIP leader  was  to  prevent  migrants  suffering from life-threatening
diseases, such as AIDS, from coming to the UK so that British taxpayers would not have to
pay for foreigners' expensive treatments.
The highest point of the campaign was certainly the seven leaders' debate broadcast on
ITV on 2 April. As a good TV performer, Nigel Farage was a clear favourite in this debate,
all the more so since one year earlier he had come out as the definite winner of the two
debates he had had with Nick Clegg on Europe ahead of the European elections. The UKIP
leader started by playing the usual populist card, saying that the six other leaders were
all the same, supporting EU membership and thus open-door immigration, contrary to
him and his party.  Later on,  he resorted to more aggressive tactics and repeated his
opposition to what he termed "health tourism": 
Here’s a fact, and I’m sure other people will be mortified that I dare to talk about it. There
are 7000 diagnoses in this country every year for people who are HIV positive, which is
not a good place for any of them to be, I know, but 60% of them are not British nationals.
You can come into Britain, from anywhere in the world, and get diagnosed with HIV, and
get the anti-retroviral drugs which cost up to £25,000 per year per patient. I know there
are some horrible things happening in many parts of the world, but what we need to do is
to put the NHS for British people and families who, in many cases, have paid into this
system for decades.5
This intervention provoked outrage on social media, and on the TV set Leanne Wood,
leader of Plaid Cymru, replied to Farage: "You ought to be ashamed of yourself". This was
typical Farage, playing the provocative card to capture attention, thereby appearing as a
divisive, polarising figure arousing strong feelings, whether positive or negative, as polls
demonstrated after the debate.  Yet,  unfortunately for him, the leader who made the
strongest impression that night was Nicola Sturgeon, who appeared to have stolen the
show away from him, appearing as the new rising star.  In a further move to attract
attention  in  this  campaign  where  he  found  it  hard  to  exist,  Nigel  Farage  used
confrontational tactics again during one of the BBC debates, turning on the audience and
its "left-wing standards", obviously playing polemical to strike the voters' minds.
While  resorting  to  aggressive  tactics  to  catch  attention,  the  party's  campaign  also
endeavoured to prove that UKIP had reached a new political dimension. The party tried
to position itself as a credible political force with a role to play in the balance of power
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after  the  election  as  opinion  polls  predicted  another  hung  parliament.  Nigel  Farage
declared that he was ready to strike a deal with the Conservative party in return for an
immediate referendum on EU membership. UKIP clearly aimed to achieve a new political
status  in  this  election  and  to  appear  as  a  plausible  coalition  partner.  Part  of  this
rebranding strategy was the party's manifesto which was supposed to herald a new era
for UKIP.
 
UKIP's manifesto: a bid for credibility
UKIP launched its manifesto on 15 April. The document, entitled "Believe in Britain", is 76
pages long. Its ambition was clearly to show that UKIP has reached a new stage in its
evolution, reflecting the process of professionalization it has been undergoing in the last
couple of years. The party's efforts to gain credibility is illustrated by its claim that its
programme  is  fully-costed  as  it  has  been  audited  by  an  independent  think-tank,  in
contrast with the 2010 general election manifesto which had been later dismissed by
Nigel Farage as "nonsense and drivel".6 Suzanne Evans, UKIP's deputy chairman and policy
chief in charge of writing the manifesto, presented it as an answer to UKIP's detractors: "
Our manifesto also throws down the gauntlet to those who have ridiculed us, jeered at us and lied
about our voters, our people and our policies. It tells the truth about what UKIP stands for".7 The
party's wish to be taken seriously is mirrored in its endeavour to present a wide-ranging
programme, going beyond immigration and Europe, although according to the manifesto,
funding of its plans was mainly to be provided by withdrawal from the European Union
(EU).
Throughout the document, UKIP reasserted its populist credentials, presenting itself as
the only real alternative to the other parties which it claims are all the same. The party
obviously targets former abstainers who have been identified as part  of  its  potential
electorate: "Now there is something to vote for".8 UKIP aims at giving power back to the
people, through regular referenda and the promotion of local democracy. In a typically
populist  discourse,  the  language  is  straightforward  and  frequently  invokes common
sense: “UKIP will bring back power to the people with common sense, local policies which will
make people’s lives easier. UKIP councilors know who is boss: we only answer to you."9 
Reducing immigration was UKIP's number one priority, impacting other policy areas as
the party considers that immigration puts pressure on employment, housing and public
services such as education and the NHS. The party advocates a five-year ban on unskilled
immigration and the introduction of an Australian-style points based system to select
migrants according to their skills. The manifesto also seeks to clarify the confusion over
immigration figures which had undermined its credibility, setting a cap of 50,000 highly-
skilled work visas per year – which is noticeably different from an overall  migration
target.  However,  the  party  is  also  very  careful  to  shun accusations  of  racism,  in  an
attempt to counteract the negative impact of recurrent racist statements within its own
ranks: "Immigration is not about race; it is about space. Immigrants are not the problem; it is the
current immigration system that is broken".10 Under a UKIP government, new migrants would
have to pay into the system for five years before being able to claim benefits, access to
NHS  services  or  social  housing  –  the  manifesto  seems  to  have  dropped  the  idea  of
imposing private schooling. The document also takes up the idea of "health tourism" on
which Nigel Farage has been vigorously campaigning: "UKIP will put the ‘national’ back into
our national health service.  (…) The NHS is the National Health Service,  not the International
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Health Service".11 In a typically populist rhetoric, UKIP presents itself as the only party
ready to face reality on this matter, contrary to "the other parties (which) have their heads
stuck well  and truly in the sand".12 In the field of work, UKIP intended to allow British
companies to employ British citizens first, in an echo to Gordon Brown's "British jobs for
British workers" controversial  phrase in 2007 but also to the British National Party's
slogan.
According  to  UKIP,  the  UK's  incapacity  to  control  its  borders  is  the  result  of  its
membership of the EU and the principle of the free movement of people – hence the
necessity of "Brexit", which is the very raison d'être of UKIP. The party would therefore
hold an in/out referendum as soon as possible, on the basis of the following (and very
biased) question: "Do you wish Britain to be a free, independent, sovereign democracy?"13 In a
bid for respectability and credibility, the manifesto invokes Winston Churchill's vision of
Britain's relationship with Europe: “We have our own dream and our own task. We are with
Europe, but not of it. We are linked, but not combined. We are interested and associated, but not
absorbed."14 According to UKIP, Britain's relations with Europe should be limited to a trade
partnership, and the country should aim to "foster closer ties with the Anglosphere"15 – a
typically eurosceptic argument used to move beyond EU membership and defend a more
global vision of Britain's role in the world.
The third main element of UKIP's policies is tax cuts. The party wants to abolish the
inheritance tax and increase the threshold for paying 40% income tax to £55,000, in a
clear appeal to high earners. At the same time, the party pledges to take minimum wage
earners  out  of  income  tax,  thereby  reflecting  its  recent  shift  of  focus  towards  the
working-class, which a recent academic study has identified as the main basis of UKIP
support.16 Accordingly,  UKIP  has  been  increasingly  and  openly  targeting  traditional
Labour voters lately in a move to widen its electoral appeal. Yet, the party's origins and
ideology also keep it close to the right-wing of the Conservative party.17 UKIP has justified
this catch-all dimension by an aspiration to transcend the traditional cleavage between
left and right, in a political strategy to woo voters from all persuasions and backgrounds:
"This party is not about left and right – this party is about right and wrong".18
Another policy which caught the media's attention during the campaign was UKIP's plan
to cut overseas aid by more than two-thirds, because "charity should begin at home".19 The
party also expressed the intention to close the "wasteful" Department for International
Development (DfID) and merge its functions into the Foreign Office. Other Departments
were to be abolished as well,  such as the Department for Energy and Climate Change
(reflecting UKIP's sceptical stance on climate change) and the Department for Culture,
Media and Sport. By contrast, the party was committed to increasing the defence budget,
first to 2% of GDP and then "substantially".20 UKIP also pledged to invest an extra £3bn a
year  into  the  English  NHS,  in  a  tactical  move  designed to  reassure  voters  following
damaging rumours that the party was intent on privatizing the NHS. As far as education
is  concerned,  UKIP  supports  the  creation  of  grammar-schools  and  argued  in  the
manifesto  that  it  would  ultimately  like  to  have  one  in every  town.  The  party  also
promised  to  remove  tuition  fees  for  students  taking  approved  degrees  in  Science,
Technology, Engineering, Mathematics and Medicine (STEMM), provided they work and
pay tax in the UK for five years after graduation. Students from the EU were to pay the
same fee rates as international students. In terms of political reform, in the manifesto
UKIP stuck to its previous pledge to introduce "English vote for English laws" and was in
favour of a proportional voting system. Finally, UKIP rejected multiculturalism which "
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has led to an alarming fragmentation of British society" and aimed to promote Britishness and
"a unifying British culture".21
UKIP's manifesto therefore aimed at demonstrating the party's new credibility on the
British  political  stage  as  a  result  of  its  evolution  towards  professionalisation.  Yet,  u
nfortunately for the party, its choice to focus its campaign on immigration – the issue on
which the party enjoys the greatest amount of support compared with other parties – did
not pay off, as it actually played a relatively small part in the election campaign which
was more centred on the economy. Europe was not an issue either, as David Cameron's
referendum pledge seemed to have cleared the air on that matter. UKIP was therefore
denied the space it had been used to occupying in recent years and was squeezed out of
the campaign, finding it hard even to exist, which helps to account for Nigel Farage's
aggressive tactics to capture attention. The party also suffered from the competition with
the  new insurgent  leader  of the  SNP,  Nicola  Sturgeon,  who combined charisma and
novelty, attracting media attention to the detriment of the more familiar Nigel Farage
and UKIP. As election day approached, the impression was that the UKIP campaign had
failed to take off. 
 
The election results: from disappointment to civil war
The general election results on 7 May fell short of the party's expectations as UKIP only
returned one MP to Westminster – namely Douglas Carswell, a former Conservative MP.
Yet,  the party performed strongly in terms of vote share,  coming third ahead of the
Liberal  Democrats  with  12.6% of  the  vote,  thereby  quadrupling  its  2010  score.  UKIP
gathered nearly 4 million votes nationwide,  the discrepancy between votes and seats
being a result of the first-past-the-post system. Comparatively, the SNP got 4.7% of the
votes and gained 56 seats in the House of Commons. UKIP denounced the unfairness of
the  "broken"  electoral  system which  had  "disenfranchised"22 millions  of  voters,  and
announced its intention to make electoral reform a new priority. 
However  disappointing  the  results  turned  out  to  be  in  terms  of  seats  won,  UKIP's
performance still remains remarkable: for the first time in its history, the party came
second in 120 constituencies across England and Wales -both Tory (76) and Labour (44)-
prompting it to declare that it has now "become the voice of opposition to the establishment".23
The  party  has  definitely  raised  its  electoral  profile  and  seems  to  have  replaced  the
Liberal-Democrats as an alternative to the two major parties. The challenge for UKIP now
is to find the means to build on these second places in the perspective of the 2020 general
election, by improving its party machine in order to turn its substantial support into
actual seats.  Evidence of UKIP's progress is also borne out by the fact that the party
increased its vote share by more than any other party in 468 constituencies across the
country since the previous general election.24
Although the "UKIP effect" was not as significant as expected, be it during the election
campaign or in the number of seats won by the party, its indirect influence is worth
examining: which party did UKIP take votes from? For a long time, UKIP was mostly seen
as a threat to the Conservatives. The party has worked hard to shed its image as a splinter
group of the Conservative party, resulting from the ideological proximity between the
two parties but also from the significant number of Tory politicians who have defected to
UKIP over the years since its foundation – as was the case for its first two elected MPs in
the autumn 2014. In order to distance itself from the Conservative party and widen its
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electoral support base, UKIP has operated a strategic populist shift which has boosted its
potential damaging effect on Labour. Recent academic research by Ford and Goodwin has
demonstrated the extent  of  that  threat,  showing that  a  growing proportion of  UKIP
support  comes  from  traditional  Labour  backgrounds-the  "left-behind"  voters.25
Increasing awareness of this new electoral potential has incited UKIP to target the blue-
collar vote with measures such as taking minimum wage earners out of the income tax,
with Nigel Farage explicitly acknowledging his intention to extend his party's political
territory: "We are now parking our tanks on the Labour party’s lawn".26 
As a matter of fact, UKIP supporters should not be regarded as a homogeneous group, but
rather as a coalition of disaffected electors from the three main parties, as well as former
abstainers, who vote UKIP for different reasons. The catch-all dimension of UKIP was
illustrated by the 2014 European elections, in which the party finished first, taking votes
from the three major parties to an unprecedented extent. However, several studies27 have
shown  that  the  sharpest  increase  in  recent  UKIP  support  has  come  from  non-Tory
supporters, vindicating the party's populist strategy. This has been reflected in the recent
inroads UKIP has made into Labour heartlands in the North, while early UKIP support was
mainly concentrated in the South of England. 
The general election results tend to indicate that many Conservative supporters who may
have considered defecting to UKIP finally cast their votes for David Cameron, for fear of
the "coalition of  chaos" between Labour and the SNP which the Prime Minister  had
warned  of  in  the  run-up  to  the  election.  Cameron  had  also  directly  appealed  to
Conservative defectors to UKIP to "come back home"28 to the Tories or risk handing power
to Ed Miliband. The "Vote UKIP, Get Labour" message reiterated by the Conservatives for
months  may also  have  persuaded a  wider  proportion  of  UKIP  supporters  to  opt  for
tactical  voting  in  specific  areas,  as  Nigel  Farage had  himself  suggested  during  the
campaign  –  the  Conservative party  being  the  only  one  to  offer  a  referendum  on
membership of the European Union apart from UKIP. The result was that the Labour
party was the main victim of UKIP in this election: in Labour-held seats where UKIP
advanced strongly, the Labour vote dropped by 4%. In comparable circumstances, the
Tory vote only fell by 2 %. The insurgent party might even have deprived Labour of a
handful of seats, as the UKIP vote was higher than the size of the Tory majority in 9 seats
which the Conservative party won from Labour.29 
Moreover, UKIP's disappointment was partially mitigated by the fact that in the local
elections taking place on the same day as the general election, it won control of its first
council  in  Thanet,  somewhat  compensating  for  Nigel  Farage's  failure  to  win  a
parliamentary seat in the area. Following his defeat, Farage kept his word and announced
that he was stepping down as party leader, thereby turning a new page of UKIP's history –
only to turn it  back three days later,  prompting an internal civil  war reminiscent of
UKIP's past leadership quarrels. Indeed, Farage declared that he had finally withdrawn
his resignation following a meeting with the party's national executive committee which
had unanimously rejected it, pleading with him to remain as leader. 
This  U-turn triggered an internal  crisis  within the party,  exposing inner  dissensions
about Nigel Farage's leadership and his handling of the election campaign. Senior party
figures, among whom the party's economics spokesman Patrick O'Flynn, deplored the
"shock  and  awe"  tactics  adopted  by  Nigel  Farage  during  the  campaign  under  the
influence  of  his  inner  circle  of  advisers  who  were  taking  the  party  in  a  hard-right
direction comparable to the Tea party movement in the US. They criticised Nigel Farage's
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aggressive campaign, notably on the issue of foreigners with HIV – a policy which was
overtly condemned by Douglas Carswell after the election. Stuart Wheeler, one of the
party's biggest donors, publicly called for the UKIP leader to stand down and give way to
a less controversial figure. Farage's critics felt that a proper election contest was needed,
and concerns about a drift towards "personality cult" were raised, which might lead UKIP
to be seen as Nigel Farage's party – which is already the case actually as UKIP is very
much a one man band. While dismissing the extent of internal dissent and underlining
the "phenomenal" support he enjoyed within the party, Nigel Farage let go of two of his
closest aides who had been targeted by his detractors. The UKIP leader quickly resumed
his grip on the party, purging it of two senior party figures who had been central in the
row, Suzanne Evans and Patrick O'Flynn, who both stood down from their paid roles
within UKIP and atoned for the turmoil they had caused.
This aborted blitzkrieg, which lasted ten days, revealed inner tensions as to the running
of the election campaign, the direction of the party and the divisive figure of Farage
himself. Those questions are very likely to resurface in the future, all the more so since
the party's only MP Douglas Carswell is definitely at odds with Farage over tactics and
direction. The evolution of the party towards institutionalisation calls for organisational
and ideological changes which are currently under way, but which are also a potential
source of tensions within UKIP. 
 
Conclusion and future prospects
UKIP's disappointing campaign therefore produced disappointing results. The party lost
half its representation in the Commons, retaining only one MP – an ex-Tory, meaning
that UKIP has still not managed to win a parliamentary seat which did not involve a Tory
defector. Nigel Farage struggled to exist during the campaign, as immigration turned out
not to be a central issue and he was eclipsed by the new rising SNP leader. He resorted to
aggressive tactics and rhetoric in order to capture attention, causing a sense of unease
within the party ranks which came to the surface in the aftermath of the election. Beyond
the general election, what was at stake in the episode of factional infighting was the
referendum campaign to come: dissenters were concerned that Nigel Farage's divisive
figure could work against the paramount objective of taking the UK out of the European
Union, by alienating moderate voters. This was explicitly articulated by Stuart Wheeler
and Douglas Carswell, who called for a less confrontational figure to take the lead. 
Those concerns were dismissed by Nigel Farage, who presented his party, and himself, as
the natural leaders of the eurosceptic cause and therefore of the No campaign. He is
clearly not ready to relinquish his role in the party and take a back seat at the precise
moment when the referendum he has dedicated his entire political career to obtaining is
about to take place – this is the fight of his life: “I’ve put 20 years of my life into trying to get a
referendum and now is not the time to walk away".30 Although Farage asserts that his party is
"100% united" in the referendum campaign to come, it seems hardly plausible in the wake
of  the brief  civil  war which has just  taken place.  Nigel  Farage's  credibility  has  been
severely damaged by this episode of "unresignation", which might leave traces in public
opinion as well.  His attitude conflicts with his recurrent denunciation of professional
politicians clinging to power for their own interests in supposed contrast with his party
and himself  – the difference is  not that clear anymore.  In response to this  apparent
contradiction, Farage's argument that holding a leadership election in the run-up to the
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referendum would be a "massive, massive mistake" hardly conceals an authoritarianism
which is a typical feature of populist parties. In the words of Patrick O'Flynn, it risks
making UKIP appear as an "absolute monarchy"31 whereas it purports to embody popular
democracy.
From a wider perspective however, the post-election internal strife should not hide the
tremendous progress made by UKIP in this general election, despite the fact that it only
translated  into  a  single  seat.  It  shows  that  contrary  to what  some  detractors  had
anticipated, the UKIP bubble has not burst yet: the insurgent party is here to stay, not
only for the referendum campaign but also most probably beyond that.  For the time
being, the party's prospects for the 2020 general election look promising. Who will lead
the party then is another question, although Nigel Farage has recently declared that he
wants to remain leader for 20 more years – a provocative joke which some in his party
may have found hard to laugh at.
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ABSTRACTS
As 2015 began, UKIP's electoral prospects for the upcoming general election looked definitely
good;  expectations  were  high  among  the  Ukippers,  all  the  more  so  since  another  hung
parliament seemed very likely, possibly giving the party a role to play in determining the balance
of power. As it turned out, the results fell short of the party's expectations as UKIP only returned
one MP to Westminster. This paper aims at assessing UKIP's performance in the 2015 general
election by first focusing on the campaign, in which the party found it hard to capture attention,
despite Nigel Farage's confrontational tactics. The election was also marked by the party's efforts
to  demonstrate  that  it  had reached a  new stage  in  its  evolution and had gained credibility,
notably through a wide-ranging and fully-costed manifesto, which will be examined in a second
part. Finally, although the "UKIP effect" was not as significant as expected, the results of the
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election will be analysed and put into perspective in the third part, also reflecting on the brief
civil  war  which erupted in  the party  ranks  in  the aftermath of  the  election.  The paper  will
conclude  on  the  party's  prospects  in  the  perspective  of  the  EU  referendum  which  David
Cameron's victory has now firmly set on the political agenda.
Alors que s'ouvre l'année 2015, les perspectives électorales du UKIP pour les législatives à venir
sont résolument favorables. Les attentes sont donc fortes au sein du parti, d'autant plus que les
sondages laissent présager qu'aucun parti n'aura la majorité absolue à Westminster, offrant ainsi
au UKIP la possibilité de jouer un rôle éventuel d'arbitre à l'issue du scrutin. Finalement, les
résultats  s'avèreront  bien  en  deçà  des  espérances  du  parti,  et  la  déception  sera  grande  au
lendemain des élections. Cet article se propose d'évaluer la performance du UKIP lors de ces
législatives, en se concentrant d'abord sur la campagne pendant laquelle le parti a peiné à exister
malgré  les  tactiques  conflictuelles  adoptées  par  Nigel  Farage  pour  attirer  l'attention.  Cette
élection devait également marquer une étape supplémentaire dans l'évolution du parti dont la
volonté de gagner en crédibilité s'est notamment illustrée à travers son manifeste électoral qui
sera examiné en seconde partie. Enfin, l'analyse des résultats montrera que si "l'effet UKIP" n'a
pas été à la hauteur des espérances du parti, il reste néanmoins que celui-ci a effectué une forte
progression en termes de voix. La dernière partie s'arrêtera aussi sur la crise interne qui a secoué
le parti suite aux élections, avant de conclure sur les perspectives du UKIP, en particulier en
prévision du référendum sur  l'appartenance du Royaume-Uni à  l'Union européenne qui  doit
avoir lieu avant la fin de 2017.
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